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The long-run effects of a resident)ial property tax aud local public services 
are analyzed in the context of an urban spatial model. An endogenous labor 
market allows the local wage rate to adjust, in conjunction with residential 
and business land prices, in response to local fiscal changes. 
1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARE 
This paper analyzes separately the long-run impact of a residential 
property tax and the long-run impact of local public services in the 
context of a spatial model of an urban area with a single jurisdiction. 
Although this is not a balanced-budget analysis, we believe that an 
understanding of the separate tax and expenditlne effects on urban 
economic structure provides useful insights. Unlike most studies of 
either the property tax or local public services, we allow both the price 
of land (residential and business) and the local wage rate to respond 
simultaneously to local fiscal changes. In the remainder of this section 
we will discuss previous studies concerned with these issues, the rela- 
tionship of our analysis to these studies, and our principal assumptions 
and conclusions. 
1 This research was sponsored by the Urban Iustitute under National Science 
Foundation Grant GS-30184. Helpful comments were received from many individuals, 
especially Henry J. Aaron, Harvey Brazer, Robert Dorfman, John F. Kain, Herbert 
Mohring, Wallace E. Oates, and Sidney G. Wint,er. 
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Uespitc numerous papers on tllc rcsidcntial f)roporty tax, tlicrc still 
remains substantial disagreement over the issue of tax shifting. For 
example, Netzer [lo] stresses the view that the property tax is shifted 
forward to consumers in the form of higher housing prices, while Rolph 
and Break [lri] emphasize that property taxes may be shifted backward 
onto all factors of production which are imperfectly mobile. The dis- 
parity of conclusions is due largely to different formal structures as 
well as different definitions of the commodity to be taxed. For example, 
Mieszkowski [9] and Orr [13] analyze the property tax solely as a t’ax 
on capital improvements, while Grieson [S], Simon [lS], and Barr Cl] 
include land as well as structures in their definitions of taxable property. 
Whereas Orr Cl31 and Simon Cl81 use models which focus on the 
effects of property tax changes on the prices of land and housing, 
Mieszkowski [9] and Barr [2] allow for changes in the prices of other 
factors of production such as labor and capital.2 
Although there has been less theoretical work on the impact of public 
services, substantial disagreement exists there too. On t,he one hand 
Lind [S] and Strotz C20] have argued that an improvement in benefits 
will be partially capitalized in higher land and housing prices. This is 
also the implicit view held by Kain and Quigley [G], Oates [12], and 
Ridker and Henning [15] in their empirical work. On the other hand 
Nordhaus and Tobin [11] and Tolley pl] have argued that the local 
wage rate will fall in response to an improvement in amenities in a 
single city. As in the property tax literature, these apparently con- 
flicting views result from different underlying models. For example, 
in the theoret,ical models of Lind [S] and Strotz [20] it is implicitly 
assumed that the wage rate is fixed, while in that of Nordhaus and 
Tohin [ll] it is implicitly assumed that property values are fixed. 
The approach taken in our paper may be characterized by the fol- 
lowing points. First, our framework is a formally explicit model in 
which all results are obtained without assuming particular functional 
forms for any relationship. Second, we view the residential property 
tax as a tax on the value of both land and capital used in the produc- 
tion of housing services. Third, we analyze (separately) the effects of 
changes in a residential property tax and public services in a single 
cit,y which is “small” in relation to a larger system of cit’ies. Fourth, 
our model has an explicit spatial character to it, recognizing that urban 
land is not perfectly homogeneous because of differential accessibility 
advantages. Fifth, we allow for the fact that fiscal changes may alter 
decisions about business versus residential, und city \‘ersus rural land 
2 The works cited above are meant as examples only. See Mieszkowski [B] for the 
historical development of these issues, and see Aaron [l, pp. IS-U] for a survey of 
recent views on the “state of the art” and additional references. 
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use. Sixth, our model includes an explicit business sector in which land 
is a factor of production. And last, our model is long-run in the sense 
that labor and capital are perfectly mobile within and among cities. 
Section 2 of the paper describes our framework. There are three 
types of land use-a central business district (CBD), a surrounding 
residential ring, and an outer rural area. A private consumption good 
is produced in the CBD from land, labor, and capital, and sold locally 
as well as nationally. Housing services are produced at each site in 
the residential area from land and capital. Both capital and labor are 
perfectly mobile3 and each city is “small,” so that the (net-of-tax) 
price of capital and the level of utility are equalized over space and 
are exogenous to each city. Each individual works in the CBD and 
allocates his budget among the private consumption good, housing 
services, property taxes, and journey-to-work costs. He also consumes 
local public services, the level of which depends only upon his location 
in the residential ring. 
Sections 3 and 4 describe the independent effects on the city’s equi- 
librium of changes in the property tax rate and public service levels, 
respectively. When the tax rate is increased and public services are 
held fixed, the wage rate and the gross-of-tax prices of housing services 
and capital rise and the net-of-tax prices of housing services and land 
fall. In addition, the city decreases in area and per capita housing 
consumption declines. Changes in total population and the total stock 
of capital (business plus residential) are indeterminate. When public 
services are increased and the tax rate is held constant, we expect that 
the price of land will rise and the wage rate will fall. In this case t,he 
net-of-tax (and gross-of-tax) price of housing services and the price 
of business land will rise. Also, the city will increase in area, while 
changes in the per capita consumption of housing services, the total 
population and the total stock of capital are indeterminate. However, 
without simplifying the model or choosing particular functional forms 
for the utility and production functions, other outcomes are possible. 
For example, the price of residential land and the wage rate may bot,h 
fall as a result of public service improvements.4 
3 In our framework the term “capital” should be viewed as the generic name for 
all perfectly mobile inputs to the production process other than labor. Thus, the use 
of the term here is quite different from its usage in most short-run housing models. 
4 While our focus is on the impact of local public sector variables on factor and 
product prices in a single city, it is important to keep in mind the distinction between 
real burdens and nominal price changes. For example, it would be incorrect in our 
model to conclude that an increase in the tax rate (holding public services fixed) 
makes individuals in the city worse off then similar individuals elsewhere because 
it raises the (gross-of-tax) price of housing. A simultaneous increase in the wage rate 
will leave individuals in the city neither better nor worse off than before. Furthermore, 
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Section 5 concludes with :t brief discussion of the analytical difh- 
&ties involved in attcmpt’ing t,o analyxc the t,:rx and cxpenditurc 
sides simultaneously. 
The starting point of our analysis is the traditional theory of resi- 
dential location, amended to include a property tax and a simple char- 
acterization of public services. We begin with a city which is circular 
and is built on a featureless plain. The central portion of the city is 
occupied by the CRD and the remainder is reserved for residential 
housing. The residential sector is surrounded by a rural area in which 
the price of land, denoted by rz, is con&ant over space.5 For convenience 
we assume that land and capital are rented from an absentee landlord 
who does not enter the model explicitly.6 We present the remainder 
of the model formally in terms of four separate sectors (consumer, 
producer, housing, public) and the equilibrium conditions that link 
them together.7 
A. The Consumer Sector 
Assumption 1: Every individual has the same utility function und 
“owns” the same number of units oj’ labor services per unit time. 
Assumption 2: Every individual works a $xed number oj” labor units 
per unit time in the CBD, to which he makes a $xed number of trips per 
unit time. 
It follows that each individual will also have the same income, although 
this income will be determined endogenously in the labor market.8 
the real burdens and benefits of local fiscal changes may extend throughout the system 
of cities. See Courant and Rubinfeld [4]. 
5 We generally use the subscripts “0, ” “1,” and “2” to denote variables associated 
with the business, residential and rural sectors, respect,ively. The only except.ion is 
with respect to partial derivatives of the indirect utihty function V; see (2.3). 
GThis permits us to concentrate on the impact of the property tax and public 
services without considering the effects of capital gains and losses associated wit’h 
fiscal changes. 
7 Although models of the type presented below are well known in urban location 
theory, it is necessary to present a fully articulated model in order to make our lat,er 
analysis self-contained and to make explicit our assumptions and method of intro- 
ducing local fiscal variables. 
8 We have been unable to obtain results with a more general version of our model 
in which individuals differ with respect to tastes and/or income. However, in simpler 
urban location models, others have had limited success in introducing some of these 
complexities. For example, see Solow [lo]. We have also been unable to obtain results 
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For convenience we normalize labor units so that each individual sup- 
plies one unit of labor per unit of time. 
Assumption 3: Journey-to-work costs increase ,monotonically with dis- 
tance from the center of the city (and are independent of the wage rate). 
For simplicity, we are assuming that travel occurs instantaneously 
and that everyone travels to and from the center of the cihy and t,hen 
receives “free transit” within the CBD. Along with Assumption 2 this 
eliminates the need to consider leisure explicitly in the utility function. 
Given the above assumptions, the individual’s objective can be ex- 
pressed formally as : 
Ma:i$ze U(c, h, b(x)) 
subjkct to zc = c + (1 + t>p(x)h + ~I(.L.) 
(2.1) 
where 
x = distance from the center of the city 
c = composite private good per unit time (used as the numeraire 
with a price set at unity) 
h = housing services per unit time 
b(x) = public services per unit time (see subsect.ion 11) 
w = wage per unit time 
t = property tax rate (see subsection D) 
p(x) = (net-of-tax) price per unit of housing services per unit time” 
j,(x) = journey-to-work costs per unit time 
Rather than work with this (direct) utility function, we will express 
the household’s utility, V, as a function of prices at a particular loca- 
tion, income net of transportation costs from that location, and public 
services at that locationlO: 
V(X) = V((1 + tjp(x), w - j,(x), b(xji. (2.2) 
In terms of the indirect utility function the demand for housing can 
when population density is an argument in the utility function. The resulting external 
effect (each individual’s consumption of housing affects the utility of his neighbors) 
greatly complicates the analysis. 
9 It should be noted that the price of housing as llsed here is a rental price rather 
than a sales price (capitalized value). 
10 The usefulness of the indirect utility function for analyzing residential location 
models was first illustrated by Solow 1191. To derive the indirect utility function 
from the utility function, we solve for the market demand functions from the standard 
constrained maximization problem (with fixed income and prices), and then sub- 
siitute the demand function for the commodity arguments in the utility function. 
Tn 12.2), p is decreasing in the firsl, argument, and increasing in the second and third. 
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be expressed as minus the partial derivative of v 
price of housing, divided by the partial with respect 
with respect to the 
to income : 
1. 1-l f,((l + Q?(X), zu - j,(,X), b(L)) Vi(X) IL\.(;) = - --,---- --- =-- 
12((1 + t)p(x), 20 - j,(X), b(X)) V&x) ’ 
(2.3) 
where the subscripts to V and p denote partial derivatives with respect 
to the relevant arguments.” 
B. The Producer Sector 
Assumption 4: The composite private good c is produced in the CBD 
from land, labor and capital using a constant returns to scale technology 
with variable jactor proportions. I2 The assumption of constant returns 
to scale allows us to express the cost, per unit of output solely in terms 
of the factor prices : 
n(x) = &(r”(x), w, 91, (2.4) 
where pc(x) = cost per unit of the composite private good 
r,,(z) = price per unit of land per unit time in the CRD 
s = price per unit of capital per unit time 
and w is defined in (2.1). Using (2.4) we can express the factor de- 
mands as :13 
a;r?,(r,(x), 7.0, s) 
= demand for land per unit of output, (2.5) 
&0(x) 
11 This formula may be explained intuitively as follows: - 8, = marginal utility 
gained with $1 fall in the price of housing N (number of units of housing services 
consumed). (marginal utility of a dollar) = (number of units of housing services 
consumed). V,. Rearranging terms gives : (number of units of housing services con- 
sumed) = -8,/F,. To preserve consistent notation we will use the expression fol- 
lowing the second eqllal sign of (2.3) t,o refer to the demand for housing. 
12 This assumption is restrictive since the presence of scale economies in production 
is considered to be a primary reason for the existence of cities. However, one reason 
is still present, although hidden, in a transport assumption of our model (Assump- 
tion 5 below), which essentially limits the development of cities to regions centering 
on a fixed number of transshipment points. This is sufficient to generate scale economies 
in the transportation of the composite private good, rather than in its internal produc- 
tion process. Moreover, because of the added complexity, we will not consider taxing 
land and capital in the CBD and treating public services as an intermediate product 
in the production of the private good. 
‘3 The cost of one rmit of output is equal to the demand for each factor (per unit 
of output) multiplied by its price and summed over all factors. Differentiating the 
cost function with respect to a given factor price gives the respective factor demand 
plus some terms whose sum can be shown to be zero. 
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a&(nl(x), w, s> 
= demand for labor per unit of output, (2.6) 
8W 
___ = demand for capital per unit of output. 
ds 
(2.7) 
Assumption 5: The composite private good c is sold in a national market 
from the center of the city, and transportation costs to the center per unit 
of output, denoted j,(x), increase monotonically within the CBD.14 The 
cost at the center of the city of one unit of the private composite good 
produced at distance x is therefore pc(x) + j,(z). 
C. The Housing Sector 
Assumption 6: Housing services h are produced jrom land and capital 
using a constant returns to scale technology with variable factor proportions.15 
Given this assumption we can also express the cost per unit of housing 
services solely in terms of the factor prices: 
P(X) = 17h(x), $), (2.8) 
where rl(x) is the price per unit of land per unit time in the residential 
sector, p(x) is defined in (2.1) and s is defined in (2.4). Using (2.8) 
we can express the factor demands as: 
Whb), s> 




-~-- = demand for capit,al per unit of housing services. (2.10) 
as 
D. The Public Sector 
Since we are concerned with the effect of a given tax rate and public 
service schedule on factor and output prices, we will treat the public 
sector as exogenous (in the sense that individuals take as given the 
tax rate and service schedule). 
Assumption 7: There is an ad valorem tax, denoted t, on the prices of 
land and capital used in the production of housing services. Because the 
14 In Assumption 9 below we assume that c is perfectly mobile among cities and 
interpret this to mean that the cost of transporting c from the center of the city to 
any residential location (in any city) is zero. 
15 We have chosen to let public services enter the utility function directly rather 
than to treat them as an intermediate product in the production of housing services. 
See Assumption 8 below. 
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cost function (2.8) is homogeneous of degree one, an equal ad valorem 
tax on the price of each factor is equivalent to the same nd valorem 
tax on the net price of housing services, i.e., 
$((I + t)rI(x), (1 + OS) = (1 + M(r,(x), s) = (1 + t)p(x). (2.11) 
Sote that the factor demands per unit of output (2.9) and (2.10) are 
unaffected by changes in the propertry tax ceteris paribus, since the 
factor price ratio remains unchanged. 
Assumption 8: The composite locul public service b(x) is provided un- 
equally over space (in generulj wnd enters positively into individual utility 
functions. At each distance the public service is like a pure public good 
in that consumption is nonexcludable and independent of the popula- 
t,ion at that distance. 
I$. Equilibrium Conditions and Accounting Identities 
Assumption 9: The city is “open” in the sense that labor, capital and 
the private consumption good are perfectly mobile within and among cities. 
In equilibrium, this assumption implies that, the level of utility, the 
price of capital s, and the priec: of tIhc? private consumption good “1,” 
will be equal over sparse. 
Assumption 10: The city is ((stt~ull” tn the sense thut it is one of u lwrge 
number 0s open &es. Given this assumption, we can treat the com- 
mon level of utility, the common price of capital and the common 
privat,e good price as exogenous to any one cit,y (even though they 
are determined endogenously in the general equilibrium of the system 
of cities). 
Assumption 11: All mur1cet.s are perJectly competitive and in long-run 
equilibrium. This assumption, along with Assumptions /t and C, implies 
that prices are equal t,o average (and marginal) costs. 
Locational equilibrium (2.12). lB By Assumptions 9 and 10 the pattern 
of housing prices must be such that each individual achieves the ex- 
ogenous common level of utility, V*, regardless of his location. This 
relationship implicitly determines the equilibrium land price schedule. 
In general the slope of the land and housing price schedules may be 
positive or negative, depending on the relationship between journey- 
to-work costs and public service variations over space.” 
16 Equations (2.12) through (2.21) are contained in Table 1. 
17 This may be seen by differentiating (2.12) with respect to 5 and then solving 
for T’,(Z), the slope of the land price schedule. The land price schedule will decline 
as long as a small movement away from the CBD results in a greater utility loss from 
higher tmrlsportation expenses than it does in a gain from improved public services. 
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TABLE 1 


























Tot al tax reveniie 
Tot.al business capital 
Total residential 
capital 
v* = 5($((1 + Q-l(Z), (1 + t)s), w - j,(z), b(z)) 
1 = F,@“(Z), W, 9) + j,(z) 
=Q 
2x 
apc(ro(~), 20, s)/aw 
aiL(ro(z), w, s)larob) 
xdx = N 
N = 
ro(z0) = Q(Xo) 
rl(Xl) = r2 
al;,(r,(~), W, s)/as 
- 
Land market equi&rium (2.13). The total supply of residential land 
in any given annulus (X + rk) is approximately 27rzdx. The total 
demand for land in the annulus is equal to the demand for housing 
per person (2.3) times the demand for land per unit of housing services 
(2.9) times population “density,” denoted by n(x).18 Equating the 
demand and supply for residential land gives (2.13).lg 
I* Residential population “density,” n(z), refers (as we use it) to the number of 
individuals in the annulus (z + dz). The more common definition of population 
density-the number of individuals per unit of land area, that is n(x)/2?rz-would 
complicate the notation. Nothing of substance is affected by the choice of definition. 
IQ It is unnecessary to include an equation associated with land market equilibrium 
in the business sector because all of the private good produced can be absorbed in 
the national market. Output of the private good, and consequently the derived demand 
for land, will adjtist by construction to equilibrate the land market. 
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Product market equilibrium (2.14). Since the private consumption 
good is the numeraire with a price equal to unity, (2.14) follows from 
(2.4) and Assumption 5. Demand is always equal to supply in this 
market at the exogenous price. Condition (2.14) determines the im- 
plicit relationship between the price of land in the business sector rO(z) 
and the wage rate W. 
Total population (labor supply) (2.16). Total population, denoted N, 
is defined by (2.16), where x0 is the boundary between the business 
and residential sectors and x1 is the boundary between the city and 
the rural area. Since we are measuring labor in units corresponding 
to one individual’s labor supply per unit time, we can refer to total 
population and labor supply interchangeably. 
Labor market epwilibrium (2.16). Dividing the demand for labor per 
unit of output (2.6) by the demand for land per unit of output (2.5) 
gives the demand for labor per unit of land. Multiplying this by the 
amount of land at each location in the business sector and summing 
over all locations gives the total demand for labor. Setting demand 
equal to supply yields (2.15). 
Total tax revenue (2.19). Total property tax revenue is equal to the 
tax rate times the tax base. The tax base is equal to the demand for 
housing services per person (2.3) times the net price per unit of housing 
(2.8) times residential density, summed over all locations. 
Business-residential boundary condition (2.17). At the boundary be- 
tween the business sector and the residential sector, the bids of business 
users of land will equal the bids of residential users of land. If this 
were not true, then it) would pay one of the users to outbid the other 
just on the other side of the boundary, driving up land prices on the 
lower side and depressing them on the higher side until equality is 
achieved.20 
City-rural boundary condition (2.18). At the boundary between the 
city and the surrounding rural area the bid price of residential users 
will equal that of rural users, assumed to be constant over space.21 
Total business capital (2.20). First divide the demand for capit’al per 
unit of output in the business sector (2.7) by the demand for land 
per unit of output (2.5) to get the demand for capital per unit of land. 
20 In order for the business sector to be located in the interior of the city, it is neces- 
sary to assume that the business land price schedule is steeper than the residential 
land price schedule at the boundary. This in turn imposes certain restrictions on the 
transportation cost schedules, j, (2) and j, (2). 
21 At the boundary the residential land price gradient must be declining, for other- 
wise residential users could increase their utility by just outbidding rural users at 
a slightly greater distance from the CBD. In addition, we implicitly assume that the 
boundary of the city is unique. 
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Multiplying this by the supply of land at each location and summing 
over all locations gives (2.20). 
Total residential capital (2.21). Total residential capital is equal to 
the demand for housing per capita at each location (2.3) times the 
demand for capital per unit of housing (2.10) times residential popula- 
tion density, summed over all locations. 
This completes the description of the model. The unknowns are 
business and residential land prices, TO(Z) and T,(Z), the wage rate, w, 
total tax revenue, T, residential population density, n(x), total popu- 
lation, N, the business-residential boundary, ~0, the urban-rural bound- 
ary, 21, total business capital Ko, and total residential capital, K,. 
From these variables we can also solve endogenously for the demand 
for housing (--V,(Z)/V~(Z)) and the net price of housing ($(rl(z), s)). 
The exogenous variables in the system are the level of utility, V*, the 
price of capital, s, the price of the private consumption good, 1, the 
property tax rate, t, the rural price of land, r2, the business trans- 
portation cost schedule, jo(z), the journey-to-work cost schedule, j,(x), 
and the public service schedule, a(z). Note that of the ten equations 
three are accounting identities [(2.19), (2.20), and (2.21)] and two 
are boundary conditions C(2.17) and (2.lS)]. The remaining five equa- 
tions [(2.12)-(2.16)] are the primary relationships which are used in 
deriving the results of sections 3 and 4. We will :rssume that, a unique 
and stable solution exists. 
3. THE EFFECTS OF A RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY TAX 
Jn this section we examine the effects of an increase in the residential 
property tax rate when public services are fixed.22 We will prove by 
contradiction that an increase in the property tax rate t lowers land 
prices everywhere in the residential sector (Theorem 1) and raises the 
wage rate (Theorem 2). Following these proofs we will discuss the com- 
parative static changes in the remaining endogenous variables. All of 
the results are summarized in Table 2. 
Theorem 1: o?,(x)/& < 0 for all x. 
Proof (by contradiction) : Assume that drI(x)/dt 2 0 for all x. There- 
fore the gross price of housing services, (1 + t)p(x), increases. (Recall 
from Assumption i0 that the price of capital s is fixed, so that the 
gross price of capital will rise by the full amount of the tax.) It follows 
from locational equilibrium (2.12) that the per capita demand for housing 
services must fall, because the level of utility and the level of public 
22 For three recent studies which complement the analysis in this section see Beck- 
mann [3], Wile [22], and LeRoy [7]. 
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services are fixed, and the relative price of housing services has risen. 
In addition, (2.12) shows that the wage rate must rise; if this were 
not the case, the level of utility would be lower than in other cities. 
In the business sector, the consequence of a higher wage rate must be 
a decline in the business land price schedule, for if land prices did not 
fall, profits in the business sector would be negative (2.14). The fall 
in business land prices and the increase in residential land prices imply 
that the business-residential boundary x0 contracts and the outer 
boundary x1 expands. Since the producer of the private consumption 
commodity faces higher wages, lower land prices and a constant capital 
price, the demand for labor per unit of land at each location in the 
business district will fall (2.15). Given the decrease in the size of the 
business district, total population (labor demand) in the city must fall. 
To consider the effect of residential land price changes on population 
density, express land market equilibrium (2.13) as : 
“7rx 
n(x) = 
V,(x) ap(r,(.x), w) 
(7 0) ig .c h(r) 
Since residential land prices have not decreased (by assumption), the 
utilization of land per unit of housing services will fall or remain con- 
stant. Given that the per capita demand for housing services has fallen, 
population density will increase. Since the residential sector has in- 
creased in size (~0 has fallen and ~1 has increased), total population 
(labor supply) must rise. However, this contradicts the previous con- 
clusion that population must fall. Therefore residential land prices must 
fall if equilibrium in the labor market is to be maintained.23 
Theorem 2: dwldt > 0. 
Proof (by contradiction) : Assume that dw/dt s 0. It follows that 
the gross price of housing falls (or remains constant if dw/dt = 0) 
(2.12), and that housing demand per capita increases (or remains 
constant). Since wages fall (or remain constant), (2.14) shows that 
business land prices increase (or remain constant). Given the decline 
in residential land prices (Theorem 1), this guarantees that ~0 increases 
and x1 falls. From (2.15) it follows that the demand for labor per unit 
23 To be complete it is necessary to consider the possibilit,y that rr(z) falls at some 
locations and rises at others. From (2.12) it can be shown that the sign of &i(z)/& 
is the same as the sign of [dw/dt - p(z)(-Fr(z)/V~(s))]. Since p(s) ( -V1(z)/V2(x)), 
housing expenditures, is positive, the wage rate must rise if residential land prices 
rise at some locations. Only in what appears to be an unusual case, if the wage increase 
is greater than total housing expenditures, will land prices rise. 
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of hd will rise (or remain c:olkd:mt,) and t,hc tot a1 I)opulation (demand 
for labor) must increase. HOWCWI., the increase in land per unit of 
housing services and the increased (or constant) demand for housing 
per capita imply that population density decreases (3.1). Since the 
residential sector has decreased in spatial size, the total population 
(supply of labor) must decrease. This contradiction shows that the 
wage must rise if equilibrium in the labor market is to be maintained.24 
In the remainder of this section, we will discuss some additional 
issues relating to the effects of an increase in the residential property 
tax. If the wage rate were arbitrarily fixed in (2.12), it is not difficult 
to show that land prices would fall more (percentagewise) than the 
tax rate would rise and that the gross price of housing would remain 
unchanged. However, the wage rate increase (Theorem 2) moderates 
the magnitude of the decline in residential land prices.25 From locational 
equilibrium (2.12), with b(z) fixed and w increasing, the gross price 
of housing must rise if the level of utility is to remain unchanged. 
Thus, the property tax may be viewed in part as an excise tax on the 
consumption of housing services. (Of course, the net-of-tax price of 
housing will fall as a result of the decline in land prices.) At each loca- 
tion in the residential area consumers will purchase less housing and 
more of the private consumption commodity. 
It is important to realize that the payment of higher wages asso- 
ciated with the property tax increase does not represent an increase 
in real purchasing power. Since the city is open and small (Assump- 
tions 9 and IO), individuals will migrat’e to or from the city until utility 
is again equalized at the original level. It would be perfectly consistent 
for two cities in a system of cities to have different wage rates (paid 
in the same numeraire) for equal quality inputs of labor and yet for 
24 The wage increase results from the effects on the labor market of the residential 
property tax. If our analysis included an explicit tax on land and capital in the business 
sector, the wage change would become indeterminate since the initial response of the 
business sector would be to utilize additional laborers per unit of output thus lowering 
the marginal product of labor, ceteris par&us. 
25 From (2.12) we may calculate the elasticity of residential land prices with respect 
to a change in the ad valorem tax rate. Using the implicit function theorem, we get 
dr,(x) (1 + t) 
e,,(x)(l + t) = ___ .- 
d(l + t) J+I(X) 
P (2) dwld(l + 0 =- + -. 
~l(x)(~p(x)l~n(x)) (-vl(x)lV2(2))(aP(x)lar1(x)) 
If the wage is fixed (dw/d (1 + t) = 0) it follows that e,,(x) (1 + t) < -1 (using the 
linear homogeneity of the housing cost function (2.8)). Since the second term is posi- 
tive, land prices will fall less when the wage is allowed to vary. 
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both cities to be equally desirable as choices for residential location.“” 
This suggests that tax capitalization studies which focus on long-run 
land price adjustments and which do not consider tax-induced wage 
rate changes may obtain misleading or incomplete results. 
To examine the effects of the property tax change on population 
density, reconsider equation (3.1). The decline in residential land 
prices and the rise in the gross price of capital will lead to an increase 
in the amount of land used per unit of housing services (2.9). We have 
already argued that, the amount of housing services demanded per 
capita will fall. Therefore, the changes in the demand for land per 
capita and population density will be indeterminate. Other things 
equal, the less price elastic the demand for housing and the higher the 
elasticity of substitution between land and capital, the more likely 
that population density will decrease when the tax rate is raised. While 
we cannot determine the direction of the change in population density, 
we can see from equation (3.1) that housing density (the amount of 
housing services consumed per unit of land), 





@Jh(z>, s> ’ 
(3.2) 
must decrease solely because of the substitution of land for capital 
in the production of housing services. 
Now consider the boundary conditions of the model. Since land 
prices have fallen everywhere within the residential sector, the outer 
boundary of the city will contract. 27 The decline in city size is reason- 
able to expect, given the shift from city land use to rural land use 
associated with the residential property tax.28 Since the wage rate has 
risen, it is apparent from product market equilibrium (2.14) that land 
prices in the business sector must decline. The extent of the decline 
will depend on the substitutability of factors in the production of the 
26 This point does not appear to be realized generally. For example, Mieszkowski 
[9, p. 771 argues that “Capital and workers are perfectly mobile between communities 
so that after-tax rates of return on capital and wage rates are equal in all commu- 
nities.” The perfect mobility of labor implies that utility will be equalized, but it does 
not imply that money wage rates will be equalized. (We do not take issue with the 
statement relating to the return on capital.) 
27 Recall that we have assumed a downward sloping land price gradient in the 
neighborhood of the boundary areas. See footnotes 20 and 21. 
28 It would be fallacious to conclude, however, that the city boundary would remain 
unchanged if agricultural land were taxed at the same rate as urban land, since with 
wage adjustments urban land prices may fall more or less than the percentage change 
in the tax. See footnote 2j. 
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composite commodity. With i,l~c tlcclinc in I)usincss antI rcsitlcntiul I;~~itl 
prices, the business-residential boI&:Lry ch:mgc will be indeterminate. 
We may complete our discussion of the business sector by examining 
labor market equilibrium (2.1.5). Since the wage rate has risen while 
business land prices have fallen, the demand for labor per unit of land 
will fall everywhere in the business district. If the CRD were to con- 
tract or remain constant in area, we could conclude that total popula- 
tion in the city must decline. However, the business sector could in- 
crease in area sufficiently to overcome the lower labor demand, leading 
to an increase in total population of the city.2Y Thus, we cannot con- 
clude that an increase in the residential property tax will lead to an 
outmigration of the local popula&ion even when public services do not 
improve. 
We now consider the three accounting identities in the model: total 
tax revenue (2.19), total residential capital (2.21), and total business 
capital (2.20), respectively. From our previous discussion we know 
that housing density (3.2) unambiguously declines. Since the net price 
of housing services has also fallen, we can conclude that the total value 
of taxable property falls at every point in the residential sector. If the 
residential sector falls in size, then the total tax base declines. How- 
ever, the indeterminacy in the movement of the business-residential 
boundary makes this ambiguous. In any case, with an increase in the 
tax rate it is clear that the change in tax revenue is indeterminate. 
The change in total residential capital can be analyzed similarly to 
the change in total tax revenues. We know that housing density (3.2) 
must decline. In addition, the utilization of capital per unit of housing 
services (2.10) will diminish with the fall in residential land prices. 
Thus, at every point in the residential sector, t,otal capital used in 
the production of housing services will decrease. Total capital in the 
residential sector will decline unambiguously except in the special case 
when the business sector becomes sufficiently small, and the residential 
sector sufficiently large, to counteract the fall in capital used per unit, 
of land. 
iYext consider whether total business capital will increase or decrease. 
The lower land price in the business sector and the higher wage will 
ensure that the demand for land per unit of output (2.5) will increase. 
29 Such a result might come abollt if the property tax rate increase led to a sub- 
stantial decline in r&dentin1 land prices and a very slight increase in the wage rate. 
For some production funct,ions, a slightly higher wage would imply a slight decline 
in business land prices. The result is a slthstantial increase in t,he size of the business 
district. Since the wage rate and price of business land adjust only slightly, the demand 
for labor per unit of land falls very little. The net effect of the slightly diminished 
demand for labor per unit of land and the greatly increased size of the business sector 
would be an increase in total population. 
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Howw~r, tlic chmge in capital demand per unit, of output will be 
indeterminate. Therefore the change in capital per unit of land is 
indeterminate, as is the change in total business capital. 
4. THE EFFECTS OF LOCAL 1’URLIC SERVICES 
In this section we analyze the effects of an exogenous increase in 
public services holding the tax rate fixed. (The results are summarized 
in Table 2.) To accomplish this, we alter the model slightly so that 
public services depend on a shift parameter which we can vary exoge- 
nously. Formally we assume: 
b(.c) = 6(x, A) where - > 0 for all m. 
ax 
(4.1) 
It will be instructive to begin by considering two limiting cases in 
which first the wage rate and then residential land prices are held 
constant.30 With the wage rate fixed, if public services rise, the price 
of land must rise (2.12). Otherwise, the individual would achieve a level 
of utility exceeding V * 31 With the price of land at each location fixed, . 
it follows from locational equilibrium (2.12) that the wage will fall 
in response to public service improvements. If the wage did not fall, 
the individual’s utility would exceed V*. 
These two limiting cases suggest that when both the wage rate and 
the price of land are allowed to vary, a mixture of the above effects- 
some rise in land prices and some fall in t,he wage rate--would occur. 
The magnitudes of these changes depend upon such things as the 
“complementarity” or “substitutability” between public services and 
housing,32 and the degree of factor substitutability in t,he production 
functions for housing and the private consumption commodity. We 
have not been able to produce a simple analytical example which illus- 
30 These cases cannot be treated simply as special cases of our model because they 
would necessitate the elimination of at least one market clearing condition. However, 
in an amended version of our model which imposed either a fixed wage rate or fixed 
residential land prices, the locational equilibrium condition (2.12) would still hold. 
This condit,ion will be the only one used to illustrate the effects of public service 
improvements in the two limiting cases. 
31 In a model in which the wage rate is held fixed and the business sector S essen- 
tially ignore& Polinsky and Shave11 [14] found that land prices unambiguously rise 
in an open city, but may fall in a closed city. 
32 “Complementarity” and “substitutability” are used here to refer to the effects 
of public services on housing demand, cetcris paribus. For example, an improvement 
in air quality may increase the demand for back yards because back yards are more 
pleasant when the air is clean, although an improvement in public parks may decrease 
the demand for back yards. 
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trntex thcsc rcsu1t.s. To determine their plausibility it would be necessary 
to simulate the model using “reasonable” functional forms and parameter 
values. 
Assuming that residential land prices rise and the wage rate falls, 
we can t,race through the other effects on the city’s equilibrium. Since 
the price of residential land rises, housing densit.y rises (3.2) and the 
city-rural boundary will shift out’ward. The fall in the wage implies 
that the price of land in the business sector rises (2.14). Together wit’h 
the rise in residential land prices, this implies that the husiness-resi- 
dential boundary may move in either direction. This indeterminancy 
accounts for the indeterminancy of the remaining variables. In the 
business sector, labor per unit of land rises at each point because the 
wage falls and the price of land rises (2.15). The total demand for 
labor, and therefore the total population, will rise if the business sector 
expands in size, but may fall if it shrinks sufhciently. Likewise, t,he 
change in total tax revenue (2.19) is indeterminate even though tax 
revenue rises at each location in the residential sector (since housing 
density (3.2) and the net price of housing have both increased). Total 
tax revenue will rise if the business-residential boundary falls, but 
may fall if the boundary increases sufficiently. The change in total 
business capital (2.20) is indeterminate due to the indcterminancy of 
changes in both the boundary and the capital-land ratio. In the resi- 
dential sector, housing density and the capital intensity of housing 
production have gone up. Thus total residential capital (2.21) will rise 
if the business-residential boundary falls, but may fall if the boundary 
increases sufficiently. 
When the wage rate and the price of residential land are allowed 
to adjust, outcomes other than a decrease in the wage and an increase 
in the price of land may occur. 33 Although we have not been able to 
determine the specific conditions under which other possibilities occur, 
some intuitive explanations and examples can be provided. Since nothing 
has been assumed about the form of the utility function, the increase 
in public services may or may not be highly valued. Other things equal, 
the more public services are valued, the greater the adjustment in 
housing and private good consumption needed to equalize utility. 
In addition, an increase in public services may make housing con- 
sumption more or less desirable, everything else equal. When housing 
consumption falls in response to an increase in public services and 
public services are highly valued, the derived demand for land will 
33 Of the four possible combinations of changes in residential land prices and the 
wage, only the case in which the price of land falls and the wage rises is immediately 
ruled out by (2.12) since this combination implies a higher than equilibrium level 
of utility. 
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fall substantially. This suggests lower rcsitlential land prices, a higher 
population and a lower wage. 
The following example illustrates that both the price of land and 
the wage can fall as a result of public service improvements. Consider 
the “usual” result that a substantial increase in public services at each 
residential location leads to a decline in the wage rate and an increase 
in land prices everywhere. Now suppose that the improvement in 
public services is substantial at all locations in the residential sector 
but one, x*, (ab(x*)/dX ‘v 0). c onsider the locational equilibrium con- 
dition (2.12) at x*. Since w  has fallen (any change at the single point 
x* could not possibly have an effect on the overall labor market equi- 
librium) and b(x*) has stayed essentially constant, the price of resi- 
dential land at x* must fall to equalize utility at V*.34 Thus, even 
though public services improve everywhere, it is possible that. the 
wage rate will fall and land prices will fall at some locations in the 
residential sector. 
While this example establishes that the price of land might fall at 
some locations along with the wage rate, there is no apparent reason 
why residential land prices could not fall everywhere. However, this 
possibility can arise only when public services are highly valued and 
when an increase in public services greatly reduces the demand for 
residential housing. Assuming this to be the case, we can derive the 
implications for the structure of the city in its new equilibrium. Housing 
density (3.2) declines and the city-rural boundary shifts inward. The 
price of land in the business sector rises because the wage rate is lower 
(2.14), implying that the business-residential boundary shifts outward. 
From the labor market equilibrium (2.15) it is easy to see that total 
population rises since labor per unit of land in production of the private 
good rises and the business sector has become larger. Kate that the 
assumption of strong substitutability between public services and 
housing is necessary for the increased population to reside in equilibrium 
in a smaller residential area in which houses are produced more land 
intensively, and in which the price of housing has fallen relative to 
the numeraire. The decreased size of the residential sector, along with 
the decrease in housing density and the net price of housing, implies 
a4 To see this formally, differentiate (2.12) totally with respect to X and solve to get : 
dw ab (x) 
drl(x) 
V,(x) - + V,(x) __ 
dX ah -=- 
dx a; ’ 
V,(x) (1 + 0 - 
arl 
At point x*, ab(x*)/ah ‘v 0 implies that the sign of drl(x*)/dh equals the sign of dw/dk. 
Since the wage rate is assumed to have fallen, it follows that rl(x*) must also fall. 
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l~h:~l~ 1Jlc (as l):W (and thcrcforc tax revenue) diminishes (2.19). f<ven 
t~houglr the business sector is larger, the total utilization of business 
capital ( 2.20) may grow or decline depending on the nature of the 
private good production function. On the other hand, total residential 
capit’al (2.21) lmambiguously falls since housing density, t,he capital- 
output ratio in housing and the size of t,he resident,iul sector all decline. 
The final possibility is for both the wage rat,e and the residential 
price of land to rise in response to a general improvement] in public 
services. Intuitively we would expect this result when housing services 
are very complement,ary with public services and public services them- 
selves are not highly valued. A small increase in public services will 
then greatly increase the demand for housing and the derived demand 
for land, implying higher land prices, a lower population and a higher 
wage. TO illustrate how this case might occur, consider an individual 
who lives at the outer edge of the city both before and after a general 
improvement in public services. Regardless of how the public service 
schedule changes, hc will be paying the same price for land (t,he rural 
price of land ~2). Suppose thaLt land prices rise everywhere and that 
at the new boundary x1* (which exceeds 2,) the level of public services 
after improvement, b*(~~*), just happens to be the same as the level 
of public services at the old boundary before the improvement, i.e. 
b(zl) = b*(~*).~~ Since the price of land (and therefore housing) and 
the level of public services are the same as before, and since journey- 
to-work costs are higher at the new boundary, the wage rate must 
rise to bring the individual’s utility level up to V* (2.12). When resi- 
dential land prices and the wage rate rise, all of the determinate changes 
in the city’s equilibrium are just, the opposite of the case in which 
land prices fall and the wage falls, and all of the indeterminate results 
remain. 
The results of this section show that allowing both land prices and 
the wage rate to vary leaves the impact of public services in doubt. 
This is in contrast to the conventional view that public service in- 
creases will be capitalized as higher land prices, particularly in an open 
city. It also questions the view that wages would fall as a result of 
the increased attractiveness of the city. 
5. COSCLUDING REMARKS 
The natural next step ‘in our analysis would bc t,o derive the effects 
when the revenue raised by an increase in the propert,y tax rate is 
used to finance spatially distribubed public expenditures in a manner 
which balances the budget. To close the model in this way it would 
36 The equality is used orlly for simplicity. It is sufficient if b* (zz*J <b(.zJ 
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be necessary to specify a production function for aggregate local public 
services and a rule for distributing these services over space. While 
such a model can easily be specified, we have been unable to derive 
any formal results in the closed general equilibrium case. The pos- 
sibility of feedback effects between tax revenue and expenditures greatly 
complicates the analysis. 
Some intuitive understanding of the balanced-budget effects can be 
obtained by a comparison of the tax and public service results in 
Table 2. From the analysis of the tax side (holding public services 
fixed), we have learned that land prices will fall and that the wage 
will rise. From the analysis of the expenditure side (holding the tax 
rate constant), we have learned that changes in both land prices and 
the wage are indeterminate without further restrictions. Given this 
indeterminacy, it seems plausible that an analysis which combined 
the two sides and balanced the budget would also give indeterminate 
results. This suggests that the effects of the residential property tax 
in a balanced-budget analysis may be very different from those in the 
conventional analysis (including our own) which holds public services 
constant. 
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